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Abstract: After some general remarks about the interrelation between philo-
sophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance
tests. These are defined as the calculation of p-values rather than as formal
procedures for “acceptance” and “rejection.” A number of types of null hypoth-
esis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing
the implications of p-values in the specific circumstances of each application,
as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A variety of more complicated
situations are discussed in which modification of the simple p-value may be
essential.
1. Statistics and inductive philosophy
1.1. What is the Philosophy of Statistics?
The philosophical foundations of statistics may be regarded as the study of the
epistemological, conceptual and logical problems revolving around the use and in-
terpretation of statistical methods, broadly conceived. As with other domains of
philosophy of science, work in statistical science progresses largely without wor-
rying about “philosophical foundations”. Nevertheless, even in statistical practice,
debates about the different approaches to statistical analysis may influence and
be influenced by general issues of the nature of inductive-statistical inference, and
thus are concerned with foundational or philosophical matters. Even those who are
largely concerned with applications are often interested in identifying general prin-
ciples that underlie and justify the procedures they have come to value on relatively
pragmatic grounds. At one level of analysis at least, statisticians and philosophers
of science ask many of the same questions.
• What should be observed and what may justifiably be inferred from the re-
sulting data?
• How well do data confirm or fit a model?
• What is a good test?
• Does failure to reject a hypothesis H constitute evidence “confirming” H?
• How can it be determined whether an apparent anomaly is genuine? How can
blame for an anomaly be assigned correctly?
• Is it relevant to the relation between data and a hypothesis if looking at the
data influences the hypothesis to be examined?
• How can spurious relationships be distinguished from genuine regularities?
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• How can a causal explanation and hypothesis be justified and tested?
• How can the gap between available data and theoretical claims be bridged
reliably?
That these very general questions are entwined with long standing debates in
philosophy of science helps explain why the field of statistics tends to cross over,
either explicitly or implicitly, into philosophical territory. Some may even regard
statistics as a kind of “applied philosophy of science” (Fisher [10]; Kempthorne
[13]), and statistical theory as a kind of “applied philosophy of inductive infer-
ence”. As Lehmann [15] has emphasized, Neyman regarded his work not only as
a contribution to statistics but also to inductive philosophy. A core question that
permeates “inductive philosophy” both in statistics and philosophy is: What is the
nature and role of probabilistic concepts, methods, and models in making inferences
in the face of limited data, uncertainty and error?
Given the occasion of our contribution, a session on philosophy of statistics for
the second Lehmann symposium, we take as our springboard the recommendation
of Neyman ([22], p. 17) that we view statistical theory as essentially a “Frequentist
Theory of Inductive Inference”. The question then arises as to what conception(s)
of inductive inference would allow this. Whether or not this is the only or even
the most satisfactory account of inductive inference, it is interesting to explore how
much progress towards an account of inductive inference, as opposed to inductive
behavior, one might get from frequentist statistics (with a focus on testing and
associated methods). These methods are, after all, often used for inferential ends,
to learn about aspects of the underlying data generating mechanism, and much
confusion and criticism (e.g., as to whether and why error rates are to be adjusted)
could be avoided if there was greater clarity on the roles in inference of hypothetical
error probabilities.
Taking as a backdrop remarks by Fisher [10], Lehmann [15] on Neyman, and
by Popper [26] on induction, we consider the roles of significance tests in bridging
inductive gaps in traditional hypothetical deductive inference. Our goal is to identify
a key principle of evidence by which hypothetical error probabilities may be used for
inductive inference from specific data, and to consider how it may direct and justify
(a) different uses and interpretations of statistical significance levels in testing a
variety of different types of null hypotheses, and (b) when and why “selection
effects” need to be taken account of in data dependent statistical testing.
1.2. The role of probability in frequentist induction
The defining feature of an inductive inference is that the premises (evidence state-
ments) can be true while the conclusion inferred may be false without a logical con-
tradiction: the conclusion is “evidence transcending”. Probability naturally arises
in capturing such evidence transcending inferences, but there is more than one
way this can occur. Two distinct philosophical traditions for using probability in
inference are summed up by Pearson ([24], p. 228):
“For one school, the degree of confidence in a proposition, a quantity varying
with the nature and extent of the evidence, provides the basic notion to which
the numerical scale should be adjusted.” The other school notes the relevance in
ordinary life and in many branches of science of a knowledge of the relative frequency
of occurrence of a particular class of events in a series of repetitions, and suggests
that “it is through its link with relative frequency that probability has the most
direct meaning for the human mind”.
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Frequentist induction, whatever its form, employs probability in the second man-
ner. For instance, significance testing appeals to probability to characterize the pro-
portion of cases in which a null hypothesis H0 would be rejected in a hypothetical
long-run of repeated sampling, an error probability. This difference in the role of
probability corresponds to a difference in the form of inference deemed appropriate:
The former use of probability traditionally has been tied to the view that a proba-
bilistic account of induction involves quantifying a degree of support or confirmation
in claims or hypotheses.
Some followers of the frequentist approach agree, preferring the term “inductive
behavior” to describe the role of probability in frequentist statistics. Here the in-
ductive reasoner “decides to infer” the conclusion, and probability quantifies the
associated risk of error. The idea that one role of probability arises in science to
characterize the “riskiness” or probativeness or severity of the tests to which hy-
potheses are put is reminiscent of the philosophy of Karl Popper [26]. In particular,
Lehmann ([16], p. 32) has noted the temporal and conceptual similarity of the ideas
of Popper and Neyman on “finessing” the issue of induction by replacing inductive
reasoning with a process of hypothesis testing.
It is true that Popper and Neyman have broadly analogous approaches based on
the idea that we can speak of a hypothesis having been well-tested in some sense,
quite distinct from its being accorded a degree of probability, belief or confirmation;
this is “finessing induction”. Both also broadly shared the view that in order for data
to “confirm” or “corroborate” a hypothesis H , that hypothesis would have to have
been subjected to a test with high probability or power to have rejected it if false.
But despite the close connection of the ideas, there appears to be no reference to
Popper in the writings of Neyman (Lehmann [16], p. 3) and the references by Popper
to Neyman are scant and scarcely relevant. Moreover, because Popper denied that
any inductive claims were justifiable, his philosophy forced him to deny that even
the method he espoused (conjecture and refutations) was reliable. Although H
might be true, Popper made it clear that he regarded corroboration at most as a
report of the past performance of H : it warranted no claims about its reliability
in future applications. By contrast, a central feature of frequentist statistics is to
be able to assess and control the probability that a test would have rejected a
hypothesis, if false. These probabilities come from formulating the data generating
process in terms of a statistical model.
Neyman throughout his work emphasizes the importance of a probabilistic model
of the system under study and describes frequentist statistics as modelling the
phenomenon of the stability of relative frequencies of results of repeated “trials”,
granting that there are other possibilities concerned with modelling psychological
phenomena connected with intensities of belief, or with readiness to bet specified
sums, etc. citing Carnap [2], de Finetti [8] and Savage [27]. In particular Neyman
criticized the view of “frequentist” inference taken by Carnap for overlooking the
key role of the stochastic model of the phenomenon studied. Statistical work related
to the inductive philosophy of Carnap [2] is that of Keynes [14] and, with a more
immediate impact on statistical applications, Jeffreys [12].
1.3. Induction and hypothetical-deductive inference
While “hypothetical-deductive inference” may be thought to “finesse” induction,
in fact inductive inferences occur throughout empirical testing. Statistical testing
ideas may be seen to fill these inductive gaps: If the hypothesis were deterministic
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we could find a relevant function of the data whose value (i) represents the relevant
feature under test and (ii) can be predicted by the hypothesis. We calculate the
function and then see whether the data agree or disagree with the prediction. If
the data conflict with the prediction, then either the hypothesis is in error or some
auxiliary or other background factor may be blamed for the anomaly (Duhem’s
problem).
Statistical considerations enter in two ways. If H is a statistical hypothesis, then
usually no outcome strictly contradicts it. There are major problems involved in
regarding data as inconsistent with H merely because they are highly improbable;
all individual outcomes described in detail may have very small probabilities. Rather
the issue, essentially following Popper ([26], pp. 86, 203), is whether the possibly
anomalous outcome represents some systematic and reproducible effect.
The focus on falsification by Popper as the goal of tests, and falsification as the
defining criterion for a scientific theory or hypothesis, clearly is strongly redolent of
Fisher’s thinking. While evidence of direct influence is virtually absent, the views
of Popper agree with the statement by Fisher ([9], p. 16) that every experiment
may be said to exist only in order to give the facts the chance of disproving the
null hypothesis. However, because Popper’s position denies ever having grounds for
inference about reliability, he denies that we can ever have grounds for inferring
reproducible deviations.
The advantage in the modern statistical framework is that the probabilities arise
from defining a probability model to represent the phenomenon of interest. Had
Popper made use of the statistical testing ideas being developed at around the
same time, he might have been able to substantiate his account of falsification.
The second issue concerns the problem of how to reason when the data “agree”
with the prediction. The argument from H entails data y, and that y is observed, to
the inference that H is correct is, of course, deductively invalid. A central problem
for an inductive account is to be able nevertheless to warrant inferring H in some
sense. However, the classical problem, even in deterministic cases, is that many rival
hypotheses (some would say infinitely many) would also predict y, and thus would
pass as well as H . In order for a test to be probative, one wants the prediction
from H to be something that at the same time is in some sense very surprising
and not easily accounted for were H false and important rivals to H correct. We
now consider how the gaps in inductive testing may bridged by a specific kind of
statistical procedure, the significance test.
2. Statistical significance tests
Although the statistical significance test has been encircled by controversies for over
50 years, and has been mired in misunderstandings in the literature, it illustrates
in simple form a number of key features of the perspective on frequentist induction
that we are considering. See for example Morrison and Henkel [21] and Gibbons
and Pratt [11]. So far as possible, we begin with the core elements of significance
testing in a version very strongly related to but in some respects different from both
Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson approaches, at least as usually formulated.
2.1. General remarks and definition
We suppose that we have empirical data denoted collectively by y and that we
treat these as observed values of a random variable Y . We regard y as of inter-
est only in so far as it provides information about the probability distribution of
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Y as defined by the relevant statistical model. This probability distribution is to
be regarded as an often somewhat abstract and certainly idealized representation
of the underlying data generating process. Next we have a hypothesis about the
probability distribution, sometimes called the hypothesis under test but more of-
ten conventionally called the null hypothesis and denoted by H0. We shall later
set out a number of quite different types of null hypotheses but for the moment
we distinguish between those, sometimes called simple, that completely specify (in
principle numerically) the distribution of Y and those, sometimes called composite,
that completely specify certain aspects and which leave unspecified other aspects.
In many ways the most elementary, if somewhat hackneyed, example is that
Y consists of n independent and identically distributed components normally dis-
tributed with unknown mean µ and possibly unknown standard deviation σ. A
simple hypothesis is obtained if the value of σ is known, equal to σ0, say, and the
null hypothesis is that µ = µ0, a given constant. A composite hypothesis in the
same context might have σ unknown and again specify the value of µ.
Note that in this formulation it is required that some unknown aspect of the
distribution, typically one or more unknown parameters, is precisely specified. The
hypothesis that, for example, µ ≤ µ0 is not an acceptable formulation for a null
hypothesis in a Fisherian test; while this more general form of null hypothesis is
allowed in Neyman-Pearson formulations.
The immediate objective is to test the conformity of the particular data under
analysis with H0 in some respect to be specified. To do this we find a function
t = t(y) of the data, to be called the test statistic, such that
• the larger the value of t the more inconsistent are the data with H0;
• the corresponding random variable T = t(Y ) has a (numerically) known prob-
ability distribution when H0 is true.
These two requirements parallel the corresponding deterministic ones. To assess
whether there is a genuine discordancy (or reproducible deviation) from H0 we
define the so-called p-value corresponding to any t as
p = p(t) = P (T ≥ t;H0),
regarded as a measure of concordance with H0 in the respect tested. In at least
the initial formulation alternative hypotheses lurk in the undergrowth but are not
explicitly formulated probabilistically; also there is no question of setting in advance
a preassigned threshold value and “rejecting” H0 if and only if p ≤ α. Moreover,
the justification for tests will not be limited to appeals to long run-behavior but
will instead identify an inferential or evidential rationale. We now elaborate.
2.2. Inductive behavior vs. inductive inference
The reasoning may be regarded as a statistical version of the valid form of argument
called in deductive logicmodus tollens. This infers the denial of a hypothesisH from
the combination that H entails E, together with the information that E is false.
Because there was a high probability (1−p) that a less significant result would have
occurred were H0 true, we may justify taking low p-values, properly computed, as
evidence against H0. Why? There are two main reasons:
Firstly such a rule provides low error rates (i.e., erroneous rejections) in the long
run when H0 is true, a behavioristic argument. In line with an error- assessment
view of statistics we may give any particular value p, say, the following hypothetical
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interpretation: suppose that we were to treat the data as just decisive evidence
against H0. Then in hypothetical repetitions H0 would be rejected in a long-run
proportion p of the cases in which it is actually true. However, knowledge of these
hypothetical error probabilities may be taken to underwrite a distinct justification.
This is that such a rule provides a way to determine whether a specific data set
is evidence of a discordancy from H0.
In particular, a low p-value, so long as it is properly computed, provides evidence
of a discrepancy from H0 in the respect examined, while a p-value that is not
small affords evidence of accordance or consistency with H0 (where this is to be
distinguished from positive evidence for H0, as discussed below in Section 2.3).
Interest in applications is typically in whether p is in some such range as p ≥ 0.1
which can be regarded as reasonable accordance with H0 in the respect tested, or
whether p is near to such conventional numbers as 0.05, 0.01, 0.001. Typical practice
in much applied work is to give the observed value of p in rather approximate form.
A small value of p indicates that (i) H0 is false (there is a discrepancy from H0)
or (ii) the basis of the statistical test is flawed, often that real errors have been
underestimated, for example because of invalid independence assumptions, or (iii)
the play of chance has been extreme.
It is part of the object of good study design and choice of method of analysis to
avoid (ii) by ensuring that error assessments are relevant.
There is no suggestion whatever that the significance test would typically be the
only analysis reported. In fact, a fundamental tenet of the conception of inductive
learning most at home with the frequentist philosophy is that inductive inference
requires building up incisive arguments and inferences by putting together several
different piece-meal results. Although the complexity of the story makes it more
difficult to set out neatly, as, for example, if a single algorithm is thought to capture
the whole of inductive inference, the payoff is an account that approaches the kind of
full-bodied arguments that scientists build up in order to obtain reliable knowledge
and understanding of a field.
Amidst the complexity, significance test reasoning reflects a fairly straightfor-
ward conception of evaluating evidence anomalous for H0 in a statistical context,
the one Popper perhaps had in mind but lacked the tools to implement. The basic
idea is that error probabilities may be used to evaluate the “riskiness” of the pre-
dictions H0 is required to satisfy, by assessing the reliability with which the test
discriminates whether (or not) the actual process giving rise to the data accords
with that described in H0. Knowledge of this probative capacity allows determining
if there is strong evidence of discordancy The reasoning is based on the following
frequentist principle for identifying whether or not there is evidence against H0:
FEV (i) y is (strong) evidence against H0, i.e. (strong) evidence of discrepancy
from H0, if and only if, where H0 a correct description of the mechanism gener-
ating y, then, with high probability, this would have resulted in a less discordant
result than is exemplified by y.
A corollary of FEV is that y is not (strong) evidence against H0, if the proba-
bility of a more discordant result is not very low, even if H0 is correct. That is, if
there is a moderately high probability of a more discordant result, even were H0
correct, then H0 accords with y in the respect tested.
Somewhat more controversial is the interpretation of a failure to find a small
p-value; but an adequate construal may be built on the above form of FEV.
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2.3. Failure and confirmation
The difficulty with regarding a modest value of p as evidence in favour of H0 is that
accordance between H0 and y may occur even if rivals to H0 seriously different from
H0 are true. This issue is particularly acute when the amount of data is limited.
However, sometimes we can find evidence for H0, understood as an assertion that
a particular discrepancy, flaw, or error is absent, and we can do this by means of
tests that, with high probability, would have reported a discrepancy had one been
present. As much as Neyman is associated with automatic decision-like techniques,
in practice at least, both he and E. S. Pearson regarded the appropriate choice of
error probabilities as reflecting the specific context of interest (Neyman[23], Pearson
[24]).
There are two different issues involved. One is whether a particular value of
p is to be used as a threshold in each application. This is the procedure set out
in most if not all formal accounts of Neyman-Pearson theory. The second issue
is whether control of long-run error rates is a justification for frequentist tests or
whether the ultimate justification of tests lies in their role in interpreting evidence
in particular cases. In the account given here, the achieved value of p is reported, at
least approximately, and the “accept- reject” account is purely hypothetical to give
p an operational interpretation. E. S. Pearson [24] is known to have disassociated
himself from a narrow behaviourist interpretation (Mayo [17]). Neyman, at least
in his discussion with Carnap (Neyman [23]) seems also to hint at a distinction
between behavioural and inferential interpretations.
In an attempt to clarify the nature of frequentist statistics, Neyman in this
discussion was concerned with the term “degree of confirmation” used by Carnap.
In the context of an example where an optimum test had failed to “reject” H0,
Neyman considered whether this “confirmed” H0. He noted that this depends on
the meaning of words such as “confirmation” and “confidence” and that in the
context where H0 had not been “rejected” it would be “dangerous” to regard this
as confirmation of H0 if the test in fact had little chance of detecting an important
discrepancy from H0 even if such a discrepancy were present. On the other hand
if the test had appreciable power to detect the discrepancy the situation would be
“radically different”.
Neyman is highlighting an inductive fallacy associated with “negative results”,
namely that if data y yield a test result that is not statistically significantly dif-
ferent from H0 (e.g., the null hypothesis of ’no effect’), and yet the test has small
probability of rejecting H0, even when a serious discrepancy exists, then y is not
good evidence for inferring that H0 is confirmed by y. One may be confident in the
absence of a discrepancy, according to this argument, only if the chance that the
test would have correctly detected a discrepancy is high.
Neyman compares this situation with interpretations appropriate for inductive
behaviour. Here confirmation and confidence may be used to describe the choice of
action, for example refraining from announcing a discovery or the decision to treat
H0 as satisfactory. The rationale is the pragmatic behavioristic one of controlling
errors in the long-run. This distinction implies that even for Neyman evidence for
deciding may require a distinct criterion than evidence for believing; but unfortu-
nately Neyman did not set out the latter explicitly. We propose that the needed
evidential principle is an adaption of FEV(i) for the case of a p-value that is not
small:
FEV(ii): A moderate p value is evidence of the absence of a discrepancy δ from
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H0, only if there is a high probability the test would have given a worse fit with
H0 (i.e., smaller p value) were a discrepancy δ to exist. FEV(ii) especially arises
in the context of “embedded” hypotheses (below).
What makes the kind of hypothetical reasoning relevant to the case at hand is
not solely or primarily the long-run low error rates associated with using the tool (or
test) in this manner; it is rather what those error rates reveal about the data gener-
ating source or phenomenon. The error-based calculations provide reassurance that
incorrect interpretations of the evidence are being avoided in the particular case.
To distinguish between this“evidential” justification of the reasoning of significance
tests, and the “behavioristic” one, it may help to consider a very informal example
of applying this reasoning “to the specific case”. Thus suppose that weight gain is
measured by well-calibrated and stable methods, possibly using several measuring
instruments and observers and the results show negligible change over a test pe-
riod of interest. This may be regarded as grounds for inferring that the individual’s
weight gain is negligible within limits set by the sensitivity of the scales. Why?
While it is true that by following such a procedure in the long run one would
rarely report weight gains erroneously, that is not the rationale for the particular
inference. The justification is rather that the error probabilistic properties of the
weighing procedure reflect what is actually the case in the specific instance. (This
should be distinguished from the evidential interpretation of Neyman–Pearson the-
ory suggested by Birnbaum [1], which is not data-dependent.)
The significance test is a measuring device for accordance with a specified hy-
pothesis calibrated, as with measuring devices in general, by its performance in
repeated applications, in this case assessed typically theoretically or by simulation.
Just as with the use of measuring instruments, applied to a specific case, we em-
ploy the performance features to make inferences about aspects of the particular
thing that is measured, aspects that the measuring tool is appropriately capable of
revealing.
Of course for this to hold the probabilistic long-run calculations must be as
relevant as feasible to the case in hand. The implementation of this surfaces in
statistical theory in discussions of conditional inference, the choice of appropriate
distribution for the evaluation of p. Difficulties surrounding this seem more technical
than conceptual and will not be dealt with here, except to note that the exercise
of applying (or attempting to apply) FEV may help to guide the appropriate test
specification.
3. Types of null hypothesis and their corresponding inductive
inferences
In the statistical analysis of scientific and technological data, there is virtually
always external information that should enter in reaching conclusions about what
the data indicate with respect to the primary question of interest. Typically, these
background considerations enter not by a probability assignment but by identifying
the question to be asked, designing the study, interpreting the statistical results and
relating those inferences to primary scientific ones and using them to extend and
support underlying theory. Judgments about what is relevant and informative must
be supplied for the tools to be used non- fallaciously and as intended. Nevertheless,
there are a cluster of systematic uses that may be set out corresponding to types
of test and types of null hypothesis.
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3.1. Types of null hypothesis
We now describe a number of types of null hypothesis. The discussion amplifies
that given by Cox ([4], [5]) and by Cox and Hinkley [6]. Our goal here is not to give
a guide for the panoply of contexts a researcher might face, but rather to elucidate
some of the different interpretations of test results and the associated p-values. In
Section 4.3, we consider the deeper interpretation of the corresponding inductive
inferences that, in our view, are (and are not) licensed by p-value reasoning.
1. Embedded null hypotheses. In these problems there is formulated, not only
a probability model for the null hypothesis, but also models that represent other
possibilities in which the null hypothesis is false and, usually, therefore represent
possibilities we would wish to detect if present. Among the number of possible
situations, in the most common there is a parametric family of distributions indexed
by an unknown parameter θ partitioned into components θ = (φ, λ), such that the
null hypothesis is that φ = φ0, with λ an unknown nuisance parameter and, at least
in the initial discussion with φ one-dimensional. Interest focuses on alternatives
φ > φ0.
This formulation has the technical advantage that it largely determines the ap-
propriate test statistic t(y) by the requirement of producing the most sensitive test
possible with the data at hand.
There are two somewhat different versions of the above formulation. In one the
full family is a tentative formulation intended not to so much as a possible base for
ultimate interpretation but as a device for determining a suitable test statistic. An
example is the use of a quadratic model to test adequacy of a linear relation; on the
whole polynomial regressions are a poor base for final analysis but very convenient
and interpretable for detecting small departures from a given form. In the second
case the family is a solid base for interpretation. Confidence intervals for φ have a
reasonable interpretation.
One other possibility, that arises very rarely, is that there is a simple null hypoth-
esis and a single simple alternative, i.e. only two possible distributions are under
consideration. If the two hypotheses are considered on an equal basis the analysis
is typically better considered as one of hypothetical or actual discrimination, i.e.
of determining which one of two (or more, generally a very limited number) of
possibilities is appropriate, treating the possibilities on a conceptually equal basis.
There are two broad approaches in this case. One is to use the likelihood ratio
as an index of relative fit, possibly in conjunction with an application of Bayes
theorem. The other, more in accord with the error probability approach, is to take
each model in turn as a null hypothesis and the other as alternative leading to
an assessment as to whether the data are in accord with both, one or neither
hypothesis. Essentially the same interpretation results by applying FEV to this
case, when it is framed within a Neyman–Pearson framework.
We can call these three cases those of a formal family of alternatives, of a well-
founded family of alternatives and of a family of discrete possibilities.
2. Dividing null hypotheses. Quite often, especially but not only in technological
applications, the focus of interest concerns a comparison of two or more conditions,
processes or treatments with no particular reason for expecting the outcome to be
exactly or nearly identical, e.g., compared with a standard a new drug may increase
or may decrease survival rates.
One, in effect, combines two tests, the first to examine the possibility that µ > µ0,
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say, the other for µ < µ0. In this case, the two- sided test combines both one-sided
tests, each with its own significance level. The significance level is twice the smaller
p, because of a “selection effect” (Cox and Hinkley [6], p. 106). We return to this
issue in Section 4. The null hypothesis of zero difference then divides the possible
situations into two qualitatively different regions with respect to the feature tested,
those in which one of the treatments is superior to the other and a second in which
it is inferior.
3. Null hypotheses of absence of structure. In quite a number of relatively empir-
ically conceived investigations in fields without a very firm theory base, data are
collected in the hope of finding structure, often in the form of dependencies between
features beyond those already known. In epidemiology this takes the form of tests
of potential risk factors for a disease of unknown aetiology.
4. Null hypotheses of model adequacy. Even in the fully embedded case where
there is a full family of distributions under consideration, rich enough potentially to
explain the data whether the null hypothesis is true or false, there is the possibility
that there are important discrepancies with the model sufficient to justify extension,
modification or total replacement of the model used for interpretation. In many
fields the initial models used for interpretation are quite tentative; in others, notably
in some areas of physics, the models have a quite solid base in theory and extensive
experimentation. But in all cases the possibility of model misspecification has to
be faced even if only informally.
There is then an uneasy choice between a relatively focused test statistic de-
signed to be sensitive against special kinds of model inadequacy (powerful against
specific directions of departure), and so-called omnibus tests that make no strong
choices about the nature of departures. Clearly the latter will tend to be insensitive,
and often extremely insensitive, against specific alternatives. The two types broadly
correspond to chi-squared tests with small and large numbers of degrees of freedom.
For the focused test we may either choose a suitable test statistic or, almost equiv-
alently, a notional family of alternatives. For example to examine agreement of n
independent observations with a Poisson distribution we might in effect test the
agreement of the sample variance with the sample mean by a chi-squared disper-
sion test (or its exact equivalent) or embed the Poisson distribution in, for example,
a negative binomial family.
5. Substantively-based null hypotheses. In certain special contexts, null results
may indicate substantive evidence for scientific claims in contexts that merit a
fifth category. Here, a theory T for which there is appreciable theoretical and/or
empirical evidence predicts that H0 is, at least to a very close approximation, the
true situation.
(a) In one version, there may be results apparently anomalous for T , and a
test is designed to have ample opportunity to reveal a discordancy with H0 if the
anomalous results are genuine.
(b) In a second version a rival theory T ∗ predicts a specified discrepancy from
H0. and the significance test is designed to discriminate between T and the rival
theory T ∗ (in a thus far not tested domain).
For an example of (a) physical theory suggests that because the quantum of en-
ergy in nonionizing electro-magnetic fields, such as those from high voltage trans-
mission lines, is much less than is required to break a molecular bond, there should
be no carcinogenic effect from exposure to such fields. Thus in a randomized ex-
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periment in which two groups of mice are under identical conditions except that
one group is exposed to such a field, the null hypothesis that the cancer incidence
rates in the two groups are identical may well be exactly true and would be a prime
focus of interest in analysing the data. Of course the null hypothesis of this general
kind does not have to be a model of zero effect; it might refer to agreement with
previous well-established empirical findings or theory.
3.2. Some general points
We have in the above described essentially one-sided tests. The extension to two-
sided tests does involve some issues of definition but we shall not discuss these
here.
Several of the types of null hypothesis involve an incomplete probability speci-
fication. That is, we may have only the null hypothesis clearly specified. It might
be argued that a full probability formulation should always be attempted covering
both null and feasible alternative possibilities. This may seem sensible in principle
but as a strategy for direct use it is often not feasible; in any case models that
would cover all reasonable possibilities would still be incomplete and would tend to
make even simple problems complicated with substantial harmful side-effects.
Note, however, that in all the formulations used here some notion of explanations
of the data alternative to the null hypothesis is involved by the choice of test statis-
tic; the issue is when this choice is made via an explicit probabilistic formulation.
The general principle of evidence FEV helps us to see that in specified contexts,
the former suffices for carrying out an evidential appraisal (see Section 3.3).
It is, however, sometimes argued that the choice of test statistic can be based on
the distribution of the data under the null hypothesis alone, in effect choosing minus
the log probability as test statistic, thus summing probabilities over all sample
points as or less probable than that observed. While this often leads to sensible
results we shall not follow that route here.
3.3. Inductive inferences based on outcomes of tests
How does significance test reasoning underwrite inductive inferences or evidential
evaluations in the various cases? The hypothetical operational interpretation of the
p-value is clear but what are the deeper implications either of a modest or of a small
value of p? These depends strongly both on (i) the type of null hypothesis, and (ii)
the nature of the departure or alternative being probed, as well as (iii) whether we
are concerned with the interpretation of particular sets of data, as in most detailed
statistical work, or whether we are considering a broad model for analysis and
interpretation in a field of study. The latter is close to the traditional Neyman-
Pearson formulation of fixing a critical level and accepting, in some sense, H0 if
p > α and rejecting H0 otherwise. We consider some of the familiar shortcomings
of a routine or mechanical use of p-values.
3.4. The routine-behavior use of p-values
Imagine one sets α = 0.05 and that results lead to a publishable paper if and only
for the relevant p, the data yield p < 0.05. The rationale is the behavioristic one
outlined earlier. Now the great majority of statistical discussion, going back to Yates
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[32] and earlier, deplores such an approach, both out of a concern that it encourages
mechanical, automatic and unthinking procedures, as well as a desire to emphasize
estimation of relevant effects over testing of hypotheses. Indeed a few journals in
some fields have in effect banned the use of p-values. In others, such as a number
of areas of epidemiology, it is conventional to emphasize 95% confidence intervals,
as indeed is in line with much mainstream statistical discussion. Of course, this
does not free one from needing to give a proper frequentist account of the use and
interpretation of confidence levels, which we do not do here (though see Section 3.6).
Nevertheless the relatively mechanical use of p-values, while open to parody, is
not far from practice in some fields; it does serve as a screening device, recognizing
the possibility of error, and decreasing the possibility of the publication of mislead-
ing results. A somewhat similar role of tests arises in the work of regulatory agents,
in particular the FDA. While requiring studies to show p less than some preas-
signed level by a preordained test may be inflexible, and the choice of critical level
arbitrary, nevertheless such procedures have virtues of impartiality and relative
independence from unreasonable manipulation. While adhering to a fixed p-value
may have the disadvantage of biasing the literature towards positive conclusions,
it offers an appealing assurance of some known and desirable long-run properties.
They will be seen to be particularly appropriate for Example 3 of Section 4.2.
3.5. The inductive-evidence use of p-values
We now turn to the use of significance tests which, while more common, is at the
same time more controversial; namely as one tool to aid the analysis of specific sets
of data, and/or base inductive inferences on data. The discussion presupposes that
the probability distribution used to assess the p-value is as appropriate as possible
to the specific data under analysis.
The general frequentist principle for inductive reasoning, FEV, or something
like it, provides a guide for the appropriate statement about evidence or infer-
ence regarding each type of null hypothesis. Much as one makes inferences about
changes in body mass based on performance characteristics of various scales, one
may make inferences from significance test results by using error rate properties of
tests. They indicate the capacity of the particular test to have revealed inconsis-
tencies and discrepancies in the respects probed, and this in turn allows relating
p-values to hypotheses about the process as statistically modelled. It follows that
an adequate frequentist account of inference should strive to supply the information
to implement FEV.
Embedded Nulls. In the case of embedded null hypotheses, it is straightforward
to use small p-values as evidence of discrepancy from the null in the direction of
the alternative. Suppose, however, that the data are found to accord with the null
hypothesis (p not small). One may, if it is of interest, regard this as evidence that
any discrepancy from the null is less than δ, using the same logic in significance
testing. In such cases concordance with the null may provide evidence of the absence
of a discrepancy from the null of various sizes, as stipulated in FEV(ii).
To infer the absence of a discrepancy from H0 as large as δ we may examine the
probability β(δ) of observing a worse fit with H0 if µ = µ0 + δ. If that probability
is near one then, following FEV(ii), the data are good evidence that µ < µ0 + δ.
Thus β(δ) may be regarded as the stringency or severity with which the test has
probed the discrepancy δ; equivalently one might say that µ < µ0 + δ has passed a
severe test (Mayo [17]).
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This avoids unwarranted interpretations of consistency with H0 with insensitive
tests. Such an assessment is more relevant to specific data than is the notion of
power, which is calculated relative to a predesignated critical value beyond which
the test “rejects” the null. That is, power appertains to a prespecified rejection
region, not to the specific data under analysis.
Although oversensitivity is usually less likely to be a problem, if a test is so
sensitive that a p-value as or even smaller than the one observed, is probable even
when µ < µ0 + δ, then a small value of p is not evidence of departure from H0 in
excess of δ.
If there is an explicit family of alternatives, it will be possible to give a set of
confidence intervals for the unknown parameter defining H0 and this would give a
more extended basis for conclusions about the defining parameter.
Dividing and absence of structure nulls. In the case of dividing nulls, discordancy
with the null (using the two-sided value of p) indicates direction of departure (e.g.,
which of two treatments is superior); accordance with H0 indicates that these data
do not provide adequate evidence even of the direction of any difference. One often
hears criticisms that it is pointless to test a null hypothesis known to be false, but
even if we do not expect two means, say, to be equal, the test is informative in
order to divide the departures into qualitatively different types. The interpretation
is analogous when the null hypothesis is one of absence of structure: a modest value
of p indicates that the data are insufficiently sensitive to detect structure. If the
data are limited this may be no more than a warning against over-interpretation
rather than evidence for thinking that indeed there is no structure present. That
is because the test may have had little capacity to have detected any structure
present. A small value of p, however, indicates evidence of a genuine effect; that
to look for a substantive interpretation of such an effect would not be intrinsically
error-prone.
Analogous reasoning applies when assessments about the probativeness or sen-
sitivity of tests are informal. If the data are so extensive that accordance with the
null hypothesis implies the absence of an effect of practical importance, and a rea-
sonably high p-value is achieved, then it may be taken as evidence of the absence of
an effect of practical importance. Likewise, if the data are of such a limited extent
that it can be assumed that data in accord with the null hypothesis are consistent
also with departures of scientific importance, then a high p-value does not warrant
inferring the absence of scientifically important departures from the null hypothesis.
Nulls of model adequacy.When null hypotheses are assertions of model adequacy,
the interpretation of test results will depend on whether one has a relatively focused
test statistic designed to be sensitive against special kinds of model inadequacy, or
so called omnibus tests. Concordance with the null in the former case gives evidence
of absence of the type of departure that the test is sensitive in detecting, whereas,
with the omnibus test, it is less informative. In both types of tests, a small p-value is
evidence of some departure, but so long as various alternative models could account
for the observed violation (i.e., so long as this test had little ability to discriminate
between them), these data by themselves may only provide provisional suggestions
of alternative models to try.
Substantive nulls. In the preceding cases, accordance with a null could at most
provide evidence to rule out discrepancies of specified amounts or types, according
to the ability of the test to have revealed the discrepancy. More can be said in
the case of substantive nulls. If the null hypothesis represents a prediction from
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some theory being contemplated for general applicability, consistency with the null
hypothesis may be regarded as some additional evidence for the theory, especially
if the test and data are sufficiently sensitive to exclude major departures from the
theory. An aspect is encapsulated in Fisher’s aphorism (Cochran [3]) that to help
make observational studies more nearly bear a causal interpretation, one should
make one’s theories elaborate, by which he meant one should plan a variety of
tests of different consequences of a theory, to obtain a comprehensive check of its
implications. The limited result that one set of data accords with the theory adds
one piece to the evidence whose weight stems from accumulating an ability to refute
alternative explanations.
In the first type of example under this rubric, there may be apparently anomalous
results for a theory or hypothesis T , where T has successfully passed appreciable
theoretical and/or empirical scrutiny. Were the apparently anomalous results for T
genuine, it is expected that H0 will be rejected, so that when it is not, the results
are positive evidence against the reality of the anomaly. In a second type of case,
one again has a well-tested theory T , and a rival theory T ∗ is determined to conflict
with T in a thus far untested domain, with respect to an effect. By identifying the
null with the prediction from T , any discrepancies in the direction of T ∗ are given
a very good chance to be detected, such that, if no significant departure is found,
this constitutes evidence for T in the respect tested.
Although the general theory of relativity, GTR, was not facing anomalies in the
1960s, rivals to the GTR predicted a breakdown of the Weak Equivalence Principle
for massive self-gravitating bodies, e.g., the earth-moon system: this effect, called
the Nordvedt effect would be 0 for GTR (identified with the null hypothesis) and
non-0 for rivals. Measurements of the round trip travel times between the earth and
moon (between 1969 and 1975) enabled the existence of such an anomaly for GTR
to be probed. Finding no evidence against the null hypothesis set upper bounds to
the possible violation of the WEP, and because the tests were sufficiently sensitive,
these measurements provided good evidence that the Nordvedt effect is absent, and
thus evidence for the null hypothesis (Will [31]). Note that such a negative result
does not provide evidence for all of GTR (in all its areas of prediction), but it does
provide evidence for its correctness with respect to this effect. The logic is this:
theory T predicts H0 is at least a very close approximation to the true situation;
rival theory T ∗ predicts a specified discrepancy from H0, and the test has high
probability of detecting such a discrepancy from T were T ∗ correct. Detecting no
discrepancy is thus evidence for its absence.
3.6. Confidence intervals
As noted above in many problems the provision of confidence intervals, in principle
at a range of probability levels, gives the most productive frequentist analysis. If
so, then confidence interval analysis should also fall under our general frequentist
principle. It does. In one sided testing of µ = µ0 against µ > µ0, a small p-value
corresponds to µ0 being (just) excluded from the corresponding (1−2p) (two-sided)
confidence interval (or 1 − p for the one-sided interval). Were µ = µL, the lower
confidence bound, then a less discordant result would occur with high probability
(1−p). Thus FEV licenses taking this as evidence of inconsistency with µ = µL (in
the positive direction). Moreover, this reasoning shows the advantage of considering
several confidence intervals at a range of levels, rather than just reporting whether
or not a given parameter value is within the interval at a fixed confidence level.
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Neyman developed the theory of confidence intervals ab initio i.e. relying only
implicitly rather than explicitly on his earlier work with E.S. Pearson on the theory
of tests. It is to some extent a matter of presentation whether one regards interval
estimation as so different in principle from testing hypotheses that it is best devel-
oped separately to preserve the conceptual distinction. On the other hand there are
considerable advantages to regarding a confidence limit, interval or region as the
set of parameter values consistent with the data at some specified level, as assessed
by testing each possible value in turn by some mutually concordant procedures. In
particular this approach deals painlessly with confidence intervals that are null or
which consist of all possible parameter values, at some specified significance level.
Such null or infinite regions simply record that the data are inconsistent with all
possible parameter values, or are consistent with all possible values. It is easy to
construct examples where these seem entirely appropriate conclusions.
4. Some complications: selection effects
The idealized formulation involved in the initial definition of a significance test
in principle starts with a hypothesis and a test statistic, then obtains data, then
applies the test and looks at the outcome. The hypothetical procedure involved
in the definition of the test then matches reasonably closely what was done; the
possible outcomes are the different possible values of the specified test statistic. This
permits features of the distribution of the test statistic to be relevant for learning
about corresponding features of the mechanism generating the data. There are
various reasons why the procedure actually followed may be different and we now
consider one broad aspect of that.
It often happens that either the null hypothesis or the test statistic are influenced
by preliminary inspection of the data, so that the actual procedure generating the
final test result is altered. This in turn may alter the capabilities of the test to
detect discrepancies from the null hypotheses reliably, calling for adjustments in its
error probabilities.
To the extent that p is viewed as an aspect of the logical or mathematical relation
between the data and the probability model such preliminary choices are irrelevant.
This will not suffice in order to ensure that the p-values serve their intended purpose
for frequentist inference, whether in behavioral or evidential contexts. To the extent
that one wants the error-based calculations that give the test its meaning to be
applicable to the tasks of frequentist statistics, the preliminary analysis and choice
may be highly relevant.
The general point involved has been discussed extensively in both philosophical
and statistical literatures, in the former under such headings as requiring novelty or
avoiding ad hoc hypotheses, under the latter, as rules against peeking at the data
or shopping for significance, and thus requiring selection effects to be taken into
account. The general issue is whether the evidential bearing of data y on an inference
or hypothesis H0 is altered when H0 has been either constructed or selected for
testing in such a way as to result in a specific observed relation between H0 and y,
whether that is agreement or disagreement. Those who favour logical approaches
to confirmation say no (e.g., Mill [20], Keynes [14]), whereas those closer to an
error statistical conception say yes (Whewell [30], Pierce [25]). Following the latter
philosophy, Popper required that scientists set out in advance what outcomes they
would regard as falsifying H0, a requirement that even he came to reject; the entire
issue in philosophy remains unresolved (Mayo [17]).
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Error statistical considerations allow going further by providing criteria for when
various data dependent selections matter and how to take account of their influence
on error probabilities. In particular, if the null hypothesis is chosen for testing
because the test statistic is large, the probability of finding some such discordance
or other may be high even under the null. Thus, following FEV(i), we would
not have genuine evidence of discordance with the null, and unless the p-value
is modified appropriately, the inference would be misleading. To the extent that
one wants the error-based calculations that give the test its meaning to supply
reassurance that apparent inconsistency in the particular case is genuine and not
merely due to chance, adjusting the p-value is called for.
Such adjustments often arise in cases involving data dependent selections either
in model selection or construction; often the question of adjusting p arises in cases
involving multiple hypotheses testing, but it is important not to run cases together
simply because there is data dependence or multiple hypothesis testing. We now
outline some special cases to bring out the key points in different scenarios. Then
we consider whether allowance for selection is called for in each case.
4.1. Examples
Example 1. An investigator has, say, 20 independent sets of data, each reporting
on different but closely related effects. The investigator does all 20 tests and reports
only the smallest p, which in fact is about 0.05, and its corresponding null hypoth-
esis. The key points are the independence of the tests and the failure to report the
results from insignificant tests.
Example 2. A highly idealized version of testing for a DNA match with a given
specimen, perhaps of a criminal, is that a search through a data-base of possible
matches is done one at a time, checking whether the hypothesis of agreement with
the specimen is rejected. Suppose that sensitivity and specificity are both very high.
That is, the probabilities of false negatives and false positives are both very small.
The first individual, if any, from the data-base for which the hypothesis is rejected
is declared to be the true match and the procedure stops there.
Example 3. A microarray study examines several thousand genes for potential
expression of say a difference between Type 1 and Type 2 disease status. There
are thus several thousand hypotheses under investigation in one step, each with its
associated null hypothesis.
Example 4. To study the dependence of a response or outcome variable y on an
explanatory variable x it is intended to use a linear regression analysis of y on x.
Inspection of the data suggests that it would be better to use the regression of log y
on log x, for example because the relation is more nearly linear or because secondary
assumptions, such as constancy of error variance, are more nearly satisfied.
Example 5. To study the dependence of a response or outcome variable y on a
considerable number of potential explanatory variables x, a data-dependent proce-
dure of variable selection is used to obtain a representation which is then fitted by
standard methods and relevant hypotheses tested.
Example 6. Suppose that preliminary inspection of data suggests some totally
unexpected effect or regularity not contemplated at the initial stages. By a formal
test the effect is very “highly significant”. What is it reasonable to conclude?
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4.2. Need for adjustments for selection
There is not space to discuss all these examples in depth. A key issue concerns
which of these situations need an adjustment for multiple testing or data dependent
selection and what that adjustment should be. How does the general conception of
the character of a frequentist theory of analysis and interpretation help to guide
the answers?
We propose that it does so in the following manner: Firstly it must be considered
whether the context is one where the key concern is the control of error rates in
a series of applications (behavioristic goal), or whether it is a context of making
a specific inductive inference or evaluating specific evidence (inferential goal). The
relevant error probabilities may be altered for the former context and not for the
latter. Secondly, the relevant sequence of repetitions on which to base frequencies
needs to be identified. The general requirement is that we do not report discordance
with a null hypothesis by means a procedure that would report discordancies fairly
frequently even though the null hypothesis is true. Ascertainment of the relevant
hypothetical series on which this error frequency is to be calculated demands con-
sideration of the nature of the problem or inference. More specifically, one must
identify the particular obstacles that need to be avoided for a reliable inference in
the particular case, and the capacity of the test, as a measuring instrument, to have
revealed the presence of the obstacle.
When the goal is appraising specific evidence, our main interest, FEV gives
some guidance. More specifically the problem arises when data are used to select a
hypothesis to test or alter the specification of an underlying model in such a way
that FEV is either violated or it cannot be determined whether FEV is satisfied
(Mayo and Kruse [18]).
Example 1 (Hunting for statistical significance). The test procedure is very
different from the case in which the single null found statistically significant was
preset as the hypothesis to test, perhaps it is H0,13 ,the 13th null hypothesis out of
the 20. In Example 1, the possible results are the possible statistically significant
factors that might be found to show a “calculated” statistical significant departure
from the null. Hence the type 1 error probability is the probability of finding at
least one such significant difference out of 20, even though the global null is true
(i.e., all twenty observed differences are due to chance). The probability that this
procedure yields an erroneous rejection differs from, and will be much greater than,
0.05 (and is approximately 0.64). There are different, and indeed many more, ways
one can err in this example than when one null is prespecified, and this is reflected
in the adjusted p-value.
This much is well known, but should this influence the interpretation of the re-
sult in a context of inductive inference? According to FEV it should. However the
concern is not the avoidance of often announcing genuine effects erroneously in a
series, the concern is that this test performs poorly as a tool for discriminating
genuine from chance effects in this particular case. Because at least one such im-
pressive departure, we know, is common even if all are due to chance, the test has
scarcely reassured us that it has done a good job of avoiding such a mistake in this
case. Even if there are other grounds for believing the genuineness of the one effect
that is found, we deny that this test alone has supplied such evidence.
Frequentist calculations serve to examine the particular case, we have been say-
ing, by characterizing the capability of tests to have uncovered mistakes in inference,
and on those grounds, the “hunting procedure” has low capacity to have alerted us
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to, in effect, temper our enthusiasm, even where such tempering is warranted. If,
on the other hand, one adjusts the p-value to reflect the overall error rate, the test
again becomes a tool that serves this purpose.
Example 1 may be contrasted to a standard factorial experiment set up to inves-
tigate the effects of several explanatory variables simultaneously. Here there are a
number of distinct questions, each with its associated hypothesis and each with its
associated p-value. That we address the questions via the same set of data rather
than via separate sets of data is in a sense a technical accident. Each p is correctly
interpreted in the context of its own question. Difficulties arise for particular infer-
ences only if we in effect throw away many of the questions and concentrate only on
one, or more generally a small number, chosen just because they have the smallest
p. For then we have altered the capacity of the test to have alerted us, by means of a
correctly computed p-value, whether we have evidence for the inference of interest.
Example 2 (Explaining a known effect by eliminative induction). Ex-
ample 2 is superficially similar to Example 1, finding a DNA match being some-
what akin to finding a statistically significant departure from a null hypothesis: one
searches through data and concentrates on the one case where a “match” with the
criminal’s DNA is found, ignoring the non-matches. If one adjusts for “hunting” in
Example 1, shouldn’t one do so in broadly the same way in Example 2? No.
In Example 1 the concern is that of inferring a genuine,“reproducible” effect,
when in fact no such effect exists; in Example 2, there is a known effect or specific
event, the criminal’s DNA, and reliable procedures are used to track down the
specific cause or source (as conveyed by the low “erroneous-match” rate.) The
probability is high that we would not obtain a match with person i, if i were not
the criminal; so, by FEV, finding the match is, at a qualitative level, good evidence
that i is the criminal. Moreover, each non-match found, by the stipulations of the
example, virtually excludes that person; thus, the more such negative results the
stronger is the evidence when a match is finally found. The more negative results
found, the more the inferred “match” is fortified; whereas in Example 1 this is not
so.
Because at most one null hypothesis of innocence is false, evidence of innocence
on one individual increases, even if only slightly, the chance of guilt of another.
An assessment of error rates is certainly possible once the sampling procedure for
testing is specified. Details will not be given here.
A broadly analogous situation concerns the anomaly of the orbit of Mercury:
the numerous failed attempts to provide a Newtonian interpretation made it all the
more impressive when Einstein’s theory was found to predict the anomalous results
precisely and without any ad hoc adjustments.
Example 3 (Micro-array data). In the analysis of micro-array data, a reasonable
starting assumption is that a very large number of null hypotheses are being tested
and that some fairly small proportion of them are (strictly) false, a global null
hypothesis of no real effects at all often being implausible. The problem is then one
of selecting the sites where an effect can be regarded as established. Here, the need
for an adjustment for multiple testing is warranted mainly by a pragmatic concern
to avoid “too much noise in the network”. The main interest is in how best to adjust
error rates to indicate most effectively the gene hypotheses worth following up. An
error-based analysis of the issues is then via the false-discovery rate, i.e. essentially
the long run proportion of sites selected as positive in which no effect is present. An
alternative formulation is via an empirical Bayes model and the conclusions from
this can be linked to the false discovery rate. The latter method may be preferable
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because an error rate specific to each selected gene may be found; the evidence
in some cases is likely to be much stronger than in others and this distinction is
blurred in an overall false-discovery rate. See Shaffer [28] for a systematic review.
Example 4 (Redefining the test). If tests are run with different specifications,
and the one giving the more extreme statistical significance is chosen, then adjust-
ment for selection is required, although it may be difficult to ascertain the precise
adjustment. By allowing the result to influence the choice of specification, one is
altering the procedure giving rise to the p-value, and this may be unacceptable.
While the substantive issue and hypothesis remain unchanged the precise specifica-
tion of the probability model has been guided by preliminary analysis of the data
in such a way as to alter the stochastic mechanism actually responsible for the test
outcome.
An analogy might be testing a sharpshooter’s ability by having him shoot and
then drawing a bull’s-eye around his results so as to yield the highest number
of bull’s-eyes, the so-called principle of the Texas marksman. The skill that one is
allegedly testing and making inferences about is his ability to shoot when the target
is given and fixed, while that is not the skill actually responsible for the resulting
high score.
By contrast, if the choice of specification is guided not by considerations of the
statistical significance of departure from the null hypothesis, but rather because
the data indicates the need to allow for changes to achieve linearity or constancy of
error variance, no allowance for selection seems needed. Quite the contrary: choosing
the more empirically adequate specification gives reassurance that the calculated
p-value is relevant for interpreting the evidence reliably. (Mayo and Spanos [19]).
This might be justified more formally by regarding the specification choice as an
informal maximum likelihood analysis, maximizing over a parameter orthogonal to
those specifying the null hypothesis of interest.
Example 5 (Data mining). This example is analogous to Example 1, although
how to make the adjustment for selection may not be clear because the procedure
used in variable selection may be tortuous. Here too, the difficulties of selective
reporting are bypassed by specifying all those reasonably simple models that are
consistent with the data rather than by choosing only one model (Cox and Snell
[7]). The difficulties of implementing such a strategy are partly computational rather
than conceptual. Examples of this sort are important in much relatively elaborate
statistical analysis in that series of very informally specified choices may be made
about the model formulation best for analysis and interpretation (Spanos [29]).
Example 6 (The totally unexpected effect). This raises major problems. In
laboratory sciences with data obtainable reasonably rapidly, an attempt to obtain
independent replication of the conclusions would be virtually obligatory. In other
contexts a search for other data bearing on the issue would be needed. High statis-
tical significance on its own would be very difficult to interpret, essentially because
selection has taken place and it is typically hard or impossible to specify with any
realism the set over which selection has occurred. The considerations discussed in
Examples 1-5, however, may give guidance. If, for example, the situation is as in
Example 2 (explaining a known effect) the source may be reliably identified in a
procedure that fortifies, rather than detracts from, the evidence. In a case akin to
Example 1, there is a selection effect, but it is reasonably clear what is the set of
possibilities over which this selection has taken place, allowing correction of the
p-value. In other examples, there is a selection effect, but it may not be clear how
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to make the correction. In short, it would be very unwise to dismiss the possibility
of learning from data something new in a totally unanticipated direction, but one
must discriminate the contexts in order to gain guidance for what further analysis,
if any, might be required.
5. Concluding remarks
We have argued that error probabilities in frequentist tests may be used to evalu-
ate the reliability or capacity with which the test discriminates whether or not the
actual process giving rise to data is in accordance with that described in H0. Knowl-
edge of this probative capacity allows determination of whether there is strong evi-
dence against H0 based on the frequentist principle we set out FEV. What makes
the kind of hypothetical reasoning relevant to the case at hand is not the long-run
low error rates associated with using the tool (or test) in this manner; it is rather
what those error rates reveal about the data generating source or phenomenon. We
have not attempted to address the relation between the frequentist and Bayesian
analyses of what may appear to be very similar issues. A fundamental tenet of the
conception of inductive learning most at home with the frequentist philosophy is
that inductive inference requires building up incisive arguments and inferences by
putting together several different piece-meal results; we have set out considerations
to guide these pieces. Although the complexity of the issues makes it more difficult
to set out neatly, as, for example, one could by imagining that a single algorithm
encompasses the whole of inductive inference, the payoff is an account that ap-
proaches the kind of arguments that scientists build up in order to obtain reliable
knowledge and understanding of a field.
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